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Developing Kenya’s Educational Capacity in
Nuclear Security Through Nuclear Forensics
Research

K.H. Angeyo
Department of Physics, University of Nairobi, Nairobi, Kenya

Abstract
Nuclear energy’s distinctive characteristics give rise to special educational requirements. These
requirements are necessary to not only address the potential danger of nuclear proliferation, but also to
build capacity for a secure nuclear fuel circle. In this paper, I assess the status of educational capacity in
nuclear security both in response to, and in support of, Kenya’s nuclear power program. I highlight the
nuclear security educational infrastructure’s key features in the context of nuclear power, noting the low
capacity at Kenyan universities. I identify the steps required to ensure that the country’s dynamic nuclear
regulatory infrastructural framework is used effectively to build capacity in nuclear security. I then
examine the link between nuclear security and nuclear forensics and discuss efforts toward developing
educational capacity in nuclear security through forensics research at the University of Nairobi,
emphasizing in-field nuclear forensics and management of nuclear and radioactive materials out of
statutory control. Finally, I consider the research challenges and solutions, which include developing a
National Nuclear Forensic Library as a database for illicit trafficking or incidents that involve nuclear and
radioactive material. I conclude that, despite the challenges, progress is underway but can be accelerated
by promoting broader stakeholder involvement and government buy-in for more comprehensive
educational capacity building in nuclear security.

I.

Introduction
A.

Nuclear Security in the Context of Kenya’s Nuclear Power
Program
i.

International Agreements

Developing a nuclear security infrastructure requires considerable effort, especially for a country new to
establishing a nuclear power program. In consideration of this, Kenya is a state party to the Convention
on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its 2016 Amendment (CPPNM, 1979) [1]. The
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Convention’s scope encompasses physical protection of nuclear facilities and nuclear material in domestic
use, storage, and transport. It also criminalizes theft and smuggling of nuclear material and the actual or
threatened sabotage of nuclear facilities. States are required to minimize any radiological consequences of
sabotage and prevent and combat related offenses. In this regard, Kenya voluntarily shares incidents
involving radioactive material on IAEA’s Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB). Furthermore, by
2006, Kenya had already become party to the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of
Nuclear Terrorism [2], the Convention on Nuclear Safety [3], the Convention on Early Notification of a
Nuclear Accident [4], the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management, and the Safety of
Radioactive Waste Management [5]. These treaties, among other regulatory and legal provisions, whether
signed or in progress, demonstrate Kenya’s commitment to securely pursue peaceful uses of atomic
energy, including nuclear power development.

ii.

Developing Domestic Infrastructure

Following the National Economic and Social Council’s (NESC) 2010 recommendation that nuclear
power is the most viable option for meeting the country’s energy needs while reducing carbon emissions
[6], Kenya incorporated nuclear power into its energy blueprint. Consequently, a nuclear energy
programme implementing organization (NEPIO), now the Kenya Nuclear Electricity Board (KNEB),
was established. KNEB’s plans adhere to the IAEA Milestone approach and are currently in Phase 1 [7].
In the context of nuclear security, Kenya has established—via the radiation safety and protection
regulatory agency (the Radiation Protection Board [RPB])—the national Nuclear Security Coordination
Centre (NSCC), which brings together eighteen state stakeholders in nuclear energy. NSCC’s overall
objective is to promote a high level of nuclear security training and support services. The Integrated
Nuclear Security Support Plan (INSSP) was recently finalized and provides a regular summary of the
country’s activities toward enhancing nuclear security.

B.

Nuclear Security and Nuclear Power

Although a country could establish some degree of nuclear security knowledge without a nuclear power
program—for example, by promoting international non-proliferation comprehensive nuclear security
education expertise, which enables a country to more holistically manage all nuclear security issues—
nuclear security expertise is best developed in the context of a nuclear power program. Approximately
fifty countries have attempted to develop nuclear power, but the only ones that succeeded had some
degree of expertise in nuclear security and were already engaged in building a reactor. These successful
countries include Argentina, Mexico, Pakistan, South Korea, and Yugoslavia [8]. However, lack of
educational capacity in nuclear security was the key impediment to the countries that failed to develop
nuclear power [9]. Turkey, for instance, had plans to establish nuclear power as early as 1970. But
it was not until the Triga research reactor at Istanbul Technical University was built in 1979 (the same
year that Turkey ratified the 1970 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons [NPT] [10] and
Additional Protocol [1981–2001]) [11] that its nuclear power program accelerated. An effective national
nuclear security infrastructure ensures that nuclear and radioactive materials do not fall into the hands of
parties who could use them for criminal or terrorist acts and prevents acts of sabotage against facilities
and associated activities, even when in transit [12]. In order to ensure such security, educational capacity
in nuclear security must be an essential part of a nuclear power program [13]. This paper assesses
Kenya’s status and development of educational capacity in nuclear security, with focus on demonstrating
how it is both responding poorly to the country’s new nuclear power program, while simultaneously
providing the impetus for, among other similar stakeholder activities, the University of Nairobi to remedy
the situation.
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II.

Framework for Capacity Building in Nuclear Security
A.

Nuclear Security Training

In 2009, the IAEA recognized the need to establish and develop human resources for nuclear security in
member states. Overseeing capacity building and human resource development to support the nuclear
power program roadmap is among KNEB’s mandates [14]. In collaboration with the IAEA, Kenya has
hosted national and regional nuclear security training courses for border and other security personnel to
improve illicitly-trafficked radioactive and nuclear material detection capability. IAEA has provided
radiation-detection equipment support toward this initiative. In the context of IAEA’s Emergency
Preparedness and Review Mission to the country in 2015 [15], Kenya developed a National Nuclear and
Radiological Emergency Preparedness and Response Action Plan.
In terms of domestic capacity building in nuclear security, these efforts translate merely to basic skills in
responding to nuclear and radiological emergencies. Nuclear security is a much broader discipline that
relates to the prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized access and illegal
transfer, or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances, and their
associated facilities [12]. In this context, the alarmingly scant educational capacity in nuclear security at
Kenyan universities is easily noticeable.

B.

Nuclear Security Education

None of Kenya’s thirty-one universities with public charter currently have a nuclear security educational
program. Before the advent of the country’s nuclear power program, only Kenyatta University and the
University of Nairobi (the country’s oldest and largest university) had graduate programs in Applied
Nuclear and Radiation Physics [16]. These graduate programs build on the normal, basic undergraduate
Atomic and Nuclear Physics courses, and none offer Nuclear Chemistry or Radiochemistry. The
University of Nairobi’s Institute of Nuclear Science and Technology’s 1979 mandate to train human
resources in the multidisciplinary applications of nuclear science techniques is limited and, nearly forty
years later, produces only a handful of graduate students (about five every year since its inception). No
Kenyan university has a program in nuclear engineering. Furthermore, nuclear energy topics are
noticeably absent in Law, Engineering, Economics, and other related courses. Considering the
interdisciplinary characteristics of nuclear security, this narrowness contributes significantly to Kenya’s
educational capacity building problems.
Several IAEA conferences have highlighted nuclear security’s need for human resource development
programs. These include IAEA’s International Conference on Human Resource Development for
Introducing and Expanding Nuclear Power Programmes, held in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, 14-18
March 2010; and the International Conference on Human Resource Development for Nuclear Power
Programmes: Building and Sustaining Capacity (Strategies for Education and Training, Networking and
Knowledge Management), held in Vienna, Austria, 12–16 May 2014. Successive IAEA Nuclear Security
Plans give high priority to assisting states in establishing nuclear security educational programs. The
current Nuclear Security Plan for 2010-2013 [17] emphasizes the importance of considering existing
capacities at international, regional, and national levels when designing nuclear security academic
programs. As the responsibility of nuclear security rests wholly within each state, member states need
educational infrastructure development strategies. This is best accomplished through a friendly
partnership among university, industry, and government organizations that recognize the
interdisciplinarity of nuclear energy. The goal of this collaboration should be to create, develop, and
promote career pathways by adapting the existing programs to nuclear security needs. For this purpose,
gap analysis and needs assessment are crucial. This study employs these methods to bridge the gap in a
twofold way: (i) by pursuing generic capacity building in nuclear sciences to support government
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organizations in making knowledgeable nuclear power-related decisions; and (ii) by developing technical
nuclear forensics professionals to help implement nuclear security.

i.

Nuclear Forensics in Support of Nuclear Security

Nuclear forensics is the examination of nuclear or other radioactive materials, or of evidence that is
contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings. Nuclear forensics can be utilized not
only for a post-event investigation, but also for prevention of nuclear security events. For example,
nuclear forensics can help identify previously unknown nuclear security gaps at both the facilities level
and the state level, thus pointing out the existence of unaddressed deficiencies in materials accounting,
control, and physical protection as well as highlighting the existent needs to improve a country’s nuclear
security regime [18]. In the case of an explosion, nuclear forensics can reconstruct key features of the
nuclear device and can help identify its origins. Through rapid characterization of nuclear materials,
nuclear forensics is thus a deterrent in itself against nuclear security threats, such as illicit trafficking and
danger of terrorism utilizing improvised nuclear devices and/or radiological dispersal devices.
For these reasons, nuclear forensics is an essential component of the IAEA nuclear security program, in
direct relation to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) [1]. Such
essentiality is due to nuclear forensics’ role in enabling cooperation and assistance in the event, or
credible threat, of theft, robbery, or any other unlawful taking of nuclear material. Its involvement is
geared toward the recovery of unlawfully taken nuclear material, the prosecution or extradition of alleged
offenders, and the provision of assistance by member states in connection with criminal proceedings.
CPPNM’s scope extends to nuclear facilities and material in domestic use, storage, and transport. As
such, nuclear forensics plays a role in the expanded cooperation among states, enabling rapid measures to
locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear material, mitigate any radiological consequences of
sabotage, and prevent and combat related offenses. Nuclear forensics also contributes to the Convention
by assisting in the establishment of new nuclear smuggling, illicit trafficking, and sabotage offenses, as
well as acts directly contributing to the commission of such offenses. These contributions are in line with
the UN Security Council resolution 1373 and 1540 adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter in 2004
[19] and as such, states are obligated to adopt and enforce these measures and offenses.

III. Toward Nuclear Security Education at the University
of Nairobi
Presently, Kenya’s highest priority is developing measures to detect, deter, prevent, and combat illicit
trafficking in nuclear and related (i.e., radioactive and radiological) materials. At the division of Applied
Nuclear and Radiation Physics in the University of Nairobi’s Department of Physics, we have responded
to this by infusing our graduate academic courses with a technical focus (as opposed to policy focus) in
nuclear security. Our strategy aligns closely with the ongoing establishment of a sustainable regulatory
framework for the country’s nuclear power program. Due to lack of qualified staff and requisite
experimental facilities, it is not currently feasible to launch a full-fledged MSc Nuclear Security course,
according to IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 12 guidelines [20]. However, we have developed a new
program that reforms the original one, which consisted of eight 40-hour courses in the first of two years
[21]. In the previous program, during the first semester of year one, students took Advanced Nuclear
Physics plus any three fundamental courses in advanced physics, such as Quantum Mechanics or
Statistical Physics. In the second semester, students selected another four courses from among the
following: Advanced Laboratory Techniques, Radiation Physics, Radiation Measurement and
Spectroscopy, Radiation Protection and Dosimetry, and Applications of Radiation. In the second year of
study, students began supervised thesis research on a relevant topic and received credits equivalent to
eight taught courses.
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A.

New Course Structure

The new program, targeting young graduates from engineering and natural sciences backgrounds, is
composed of ten courses in year one, instead of the previous eight. In the first semester, Advanced
Nuclear Physics is retained (but appropriately revised) and is taken along with another four fundamental
courses, one of which is required to be Reactor Theory. The second semester’s courses are categorized in
five tracks, namely Nuclear Security and Safeguards, Health Physics and Radioprotection, Applied
Radiometrics, Nuclear Science Techniques, and Applied Nuclear Physics.
Below are the details of the Nuclear Security and Safeguards track. The percentages shown in the
parenthesis indicate how much IAEA Nuclear Security Series modules content is incorporated into the
course. For instance, Nuclear Forensics and Attribution borrowed fully from NS 19 [22], Methods and
Instruments for Nuclear & Radioactive Material Measurements from NS 4 [23], Threat Assessment from
NS 6 [24], and Nuclear and Radioactive Material Accountancy and Inventory Control from NS 13 [25].
During the second semester of year one, students in the Nuclear Security and Safeguards track will take
PHY-2, PHY-3, and PHY-7 plus any other two courses (following guidance) from the list below.
PHY-1: Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Fuel Circle (85% from NS 3)
PHY-2: Fundamentals of Nuclear Security (75% from NS 1)
PHY-3: Nuclear Forensics and Attribution (NS 19)
PHY-4: Crime Scene Investigation and Forensic Techniques (NS 12)
PHY-5: Threat Assessment (NS 6)
PHY-6: Methods and Instruments for Nuclear & Radioactive Material Measurements (NS 4)
PHY-7: Nuclear and Radioactive Material Accountancy & Inventory Control (NS 13)
PHY-8: Fundamentals of Nuclear Energy Management
The thesis research pursued in the second year will focus on the student’s track, but emphasize our current
research strengths:
(i) Nuclear forensics and attribution methodologies in support of nuclear security
(ii) Analysis and modeling of nuclear traces and dynamics in complex ecosystems
(iii) Size-resolved radiogenic characterization of atmospheric aerosols and hot particles
The above courses are also intended to enrich our recently developed undergraduate-level Nuclear,
Radiation & Health Physics track, where we have tailored experiments focusing on modern microscopy,
fundamentals of image formation with applications in nuclear sciences, detector electronics and digital
signal and image processing. Furthermore, our course development recently assisted the University of
Nairobi’s School of Medicine in starting their MSc Forensic Science program. We suggested and
developed two 20-hour course modules in their new curriculum, namely Elements of Nuclear Security
and Nuclear Forensic Radioanalytics.
Ideally, the new program will both motivate and prepare students for careers in nuclear security. The new
course recognizes the interdisciplinary dimensions of nuclear security and adapts the existing program to
the emerging needs of the nuclear power program. The promotion of safeguards, safety, and a security
culture are integral to the program. However, challenges continue to exist in designing a proper
curriculum and identifying appropriate teaching and assessment methods to promote student learning in
this exciting area [26]. Examples of the challenges include a lack of qualified staff to sustain a graduate
program which can be accredited and which favorably benchmarks with similar programs in nuclear
security elsewhere; the narrowed breadth of the program to fit into our nascent research line in nuclear
forensics; and the initial restriction of the program to mostly physics (and related) graduate students,
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given the interdisciplinary character of nuclear security. However, these challenges are expected to reduce
as the program matures and generates enough graduates versed in nuclear security to become faculty, and
as research capacity in nuclear security expands beyond nuclear forensics. Furthermore, the gradual
maturing of Kenya’s nuclear power program will compel infrastructural development in nuclear security,
thus providing a partner, as well as stakeholder, to our educational efforts.

B.

Nuclear Forensics as a Nuclear Security Education Tool

The Nuclear Security and Safeguards track is strongly supported by a relatively new research line in
nuclear forensics. We consider nuclear forensics research as a means to both foster scientific innovation
in nuclear security and to support non-proliferation by enabling the identification of high-confidence
nuclear forensic signatures. The research aims to support the nuclear security infrastructure necessary for
the country’s safe handling of nuclear materials and to promote its nuclear power program. Building a
nuclear forensics workforce requires a scientific education primarily in physics or chemistry with
specialization in radiochemistry, health physics, nuclear physics, etc., followed by hands-on experience
working with nuclear material and analytical techniques. Our research group is composed of three faculty,
one PhD student, and five MSc students from various backgrounds (physics, chemistry, and nuclear
science).
Nuclear forensics—normally pursued to support criminal investigation of illegal use, transfer, or disposal
of nuclear and radioactive materials—probes the relationship between the materials’ origin and intended
use [27]. Thus, nuclear forensics is a useful tool in the nuclear fuel cycle. The nuclear forensic signatures
of interest include isotopic (U, Pu, Th, Co, O, Pb, Sr, Nd, S) chemical (compound, rare-earth element
patterns, trace metal, ionic) impurities as well as microstructural information on the materials. As
materials move through the nuclear fuel cycle, these nuclear forensic signatures are created, modified, and
destroyed; therefore, each step provides information that can be used to constrain the source [28]. In our
research, we emphasize the science behind the detection and attribution of the materials. As trace
evidence and microanalysis are ubiquitous in nuclear forensics, we have developed multimodal, machinelearning-enabled nuclear forensic analytical and imaging spectrometry methodologies for this purpose,
utilizing chemical (metal, molecular), isotopic, and structural signatures of the analyzed nuclear and
radioactive materials to support national nuclear security concerns.
Advances in photonics, especially in optics and imaging spectrometry that enable material analysis at
microscale resolution, enable the development of such rapid nuclear forensic analysis methods. As a
result of the nuclear renaissance, nuclear proliferation is a growing danger that is further complicated by
possibilities of terrorism through the utilization of improvised nuclear devices and/or radiological
dispersal devices. Such risk places a critical challenge on the existing nuclear forensics analysis methods,
which are usually radiochemical or radiometric and costly, to cope with tasks that demand rapid, direct,
and minimally invasive characterization of nuclear and radioactive materials, especially if they are of
limited size and/or concealed. This underscores the need to develop new methods and improve on the
existing ones, for nuclear materials and post-detonation debris analysis. Analytical capability for microsize samples is an especially powerful tool for monitoring undeclared nuclear activity, verifying nuclear
safeguards, responding to nuclear anthropogenic releases, and analyzing materials from radiological
crime scenes. For these purposes, we employ X-ray fluorescence spectroscopy, laser-scanning
microscopy, laser Raman microspectrometry, and laser-induced breakdown/ablation molecular isotopic
spectroscopy (LIBS/LAMIS) [29–31].
While the advantage of combining the above techniques is clear, the interpretive challenges of highdimensional data [32] complicate the identity and distribution of nuclear forensic signatures.
Incorporating machine learning broadens the techniques’ applicability by enabling mining (management,
analysis, and visualization of large data sets) and extraction of useful information embedded in the spectra
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as well as images that are acquired from the instruments while providing greater versatility. For instance,
genetic algorithms hybridize deductive models and evolve predictive rules applicable to nuclear forensics
attribution, revealing unexpected information. Machine learning further enables amplified analytical
sensitivity. The major advantage of machine learning is its ability to represent multivariate data into few
dimensions in a graphical interface [33, 34], allowing us to use data fusion to derive robust forensic
attributions. Our research results are the first systematic nuclear forensics data in the country and will
help guide the development of a national nuclear forensic library (NNFL). An NNFL is an essential
facility for any country with a nuclear power program and, in Kenya, will bolster response capability to
nuclear security events through a broad spectrum of signatures and methods that contribute to nuclear
non-proliferation.

C.

Leveraging International Partnerships

Forging international links is key to creating a global, nuclear-secure regime. Since 2013, when the
University of Nairobi became a member, the activities of the International Nuclear Security Network
(INSEN) [35] have been an important catalyst for our efforts. INSEN’s mission is to enhance global
nuclear security by developing, sharing, and promoting excellence in nuclear security education. In line
with its mission, INSEN assisted in the development of the previously-mentioned new courses at the
University of Nairobi via production of teaching materials, professional development opportunities for
faculty, and global networking of staff [36]. Further international cooperation includes the International
Science Program’s (ISP) support of our nuclear forensics research line. ISP assists lower-income
countries in building and strengthening their domestic research capacity and postgraduate education in the
basic sciences. ISP funded the purchase of our key research equipment through the grant “Advancing
Integrated Machine Learning Enabled Microphotonic Approaches to Multifunctional Disease Diagnostics
and Nuclear Forensic Analysis (2017-19).” Our efforts in the nuclear forensics research group have also
been supported by The World Academy of Sciences (TWAS) for the Advancement of Science in
Developing Countries, which supports sustainable prosperity through research, education, policy, and
diplomacy [37]. In this context, TWAS helped three MSc students pursue research in nuclear forensics at
our research group under the grant “Development of Machine Learning Enabled Laser Based
Spectrometry and Imaging Approaches for Direct Rapid Nuclear Forensics Analysis and Attribution
(2014-16).”
These collaborative efforts and bilateral agreements align with Kenya’s commitment to pursue its nuclear
power program through international involvement. As such, Kenya has received IAEA support with two
national technical cooperation projects in energy planning and for 49 fellowships in nuclear energy
fundamentals since 2012. IAEA has especially supported Kenya’s quest to foster international
partnerships in the development of indigenous capacity, such as the annual training programs created by
Texas A&M University’s Nuclear Power Institute. Since 2012, these programs, developed in cooperation
with the IAEA, have offered supportive training in Nuclear Power Plant Technology.
In the same context, Kenya has signed several memorandums of understanding (MoU) with established
nuclear power countries, namely Slovakia, China, Republic of Korea, and Russia. These MoUs aim at
enhancing collaboration in the development of Kenya’s nuclear power program. Consequently, more than
400 Kenyans have benefited from trainings, fellowships, scientific visits, and technical meetings related
to nuclear power, and also through the Masters in Nuclear Engineering at the Kepco International Nuclear
Graduate School (KINGS) in the Republic of Korea.
The progress of Kenya’s collaborative efforts in the development of nuclear power depends on the
endorsement of an Act of Parliament on peaceful uses of atomic energy. This Act should be followed by
the creation of a Nuclear Energy Corporation for planning, designing, constructing, operating,
maintaining, and managing nuclear power plants. Furthermore, there is a need to create a Nuclear
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Regulatory Authority with responsibility for safety, security, and safeguards. KNEB has already
established an Inter-Ministerial Working Group, which—under the guidance of IAEA—has developed a
Draft National Nuclear Regulatory Bill (2015) and Nuclear Policy [38], providing optimism for the
future.

IV. Conclusion and Prospects
This paper has assessed the status of education capacity in nuclear security both in response to, and in
support of, Kenya’s nuclear power program. The nuclear security educational infrastructure’s key features
have been highlighted in the context of nuclear power. The low levels of nuclear security educational
capacity at Kenyan universities have been recognized and appropriate strategies identified for remedying
the situation, namely the current effort at the University of Nairobi toward developing educational
capacity in nuclear security and research in nuclear forensics. The link between nuclear forensics and
nuclear security has been examined in detail. It has been argued that the multimodal photonic
microanalytical approach to nuclear forensics research is enabling the identification of a comprehensive
combination of nuclear forensic signatures to manage nuclear materials out of statutory control. However,
more rapid progress will require stronger involvement of stakeholder networks extending to all sectors of
the nuclear fuel cycle. I propose a National Working Group on Education and Knowledge Management in
Nuclear Security in Kenya to identify a course of action and the steps required to ensure effective use of
the country’s infrastructure for nuclear security education. In this regard, the Kenya Nuclear Electricity
Board should serve as a think tank to bring all stakeholders together to discuss the plans. KNEB is the
promoter of the country’s nuclear power program and therefore it must fulfill its role in increasing and
sustaining political buy-in and government investment in nuclear security initiatives. This will improve
national capacity to build a nuclear power plant earlier than projected.
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